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Brief Remarks on Some Linguistic Features
of "Empathy" and "Sympathy"
Emanuel E. Garcia, M.D .
T he use of words by an indi vidual or cultu re is subject to the very same
psych o log ica l fo rces that d ri ve man 's o ther activities . Hence , th e h isto ry of a
word 's usage becomes a telling record of the mental processes of its creators and
users, both co nscious and unconscious. Ety mology, as Freud has observed in hi s
dreambook (1900), co ntr ib u tes significa n t ly to our unde rstand ing of the deeper
laye rs of the psych e . Let us take th e word " r ival," fo r example, and see how we
may make use of ety mo logica l data. It is deri ved from the Latin " riva lis," I which
originally meant "one sharing a st ream" or "neighbor, companion, aid" (Oxford
English Dictionary, 197 1; Sh ip ley, 1984 , p. 333). W hen Shakespeare has Ber-
nardo say :
I f you do meet H orat io and Marcell us ,
The riva ls of m y wat ch , bid th em mak e ha ste
(Ha mlet, Act 1, Sc. i, 11. 13- 14)
"rival" is used in j us t this sense : co mpa nio n, helpmee t, co lleague. Yet this
meaning is now obsolete. Today to declare so meone a ri val is to bran d him or
he r a com pe tito r, someone with whom one str uggles, a foe, an enemy. The
ine vitabl e dark side o f human rela tions is th us revealed: proximity implies
dange r , friends may betray, neighbors a ttack.
In psychotherapy, words are powerful ve hicles of emotio n. Despite the
ine vitabl e imp recision of any la nguage (see Groddeck , 1977), th e a rticulation o f
one's thoughts and fee lings remains the primary too l fo r ins ight-oriented
psychotherapy. As Freud ha s declared, " Words a re th e most important media by
wh ich one man seeks to br ing his influe nce to bear on another" (1890, p. 292).
And " mere" words in turn ca n exert th eir ow n effec t on their users. The
formal structure of a word, the associations it brin gs to one's mind , the overt
meaning wh ich a given culture has assigned to it , and, significa n t ly, its covert
lin ks by d in t of sound, form an d e tymology to a host of o ther words and cultural
a rtifac ts which may appear super ficia lly unrelat ed-all of these contribute to
molding one 's own th ought o r perspective , a lbeit in ways no t readily evident.
Groddeck (1977) unhesita t ingly speaks of "the invin cibl e cla ims by which
language enslaves our thought an d acti on" (p, 249).
Suffi ce it to say that the cho ice of a word to describe a particu lar
I Itse lf derived from th e La tin " r ivus," meaning "stream" (Lewis, 1964 ).
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phenomenon, especially in the realm of psychotherapy, is meaningful. Bettel-
heim (1983) has drawn our attention to this very issue in hi s consideration of the
authorized English translation of Freud's opus, and he convinci ngly shows how
the misrendering of Freud's words has itself created and fostered erroneous
thinking in English readers, spawning further mi sapplications to th e detriment
of psychoanalysis.
1 offer the above as a preface to a cursory in vestigati o n of some lingu ist ic
curiosities presented by a word which enjoys considerable vogue among psycho-
therapists nowadays: empathy.
When Greenson (1960) lamented the dearth of pscyhoanalytic contribu-
tions on empathy over a quarter of a century ago, it was doubtful th at he would
have foreseen the burgeoning of interest in the subj ect that has sin ce occurred.
Today one can scarcely read a case history or te chnical paper that fails to
highlight the topic. Phrases such as "empathic failure " o r "empa thic attune-
merit" liberally season the literature.
The psychiatric community has generally agreed upon a defin ition of
empathy as connoting a shared experience, i.e ., the therapist's partaki ng of the
patient's emotional and psychological state." Webster's (1986) defini t ion of
empathy as "the capacity for participating in or a vicarious exper ienci ng of
another's feelings , volitions, or ideas and sometimes another's move ments"
conveys the essence of its current usage, although one must ac knowledge, as in
all psychiatric matters, a certain variability a nd comp lex ity whi ch ca nnot be
rendered by statements that are reductionistic by nature . Nevertheless, one
obtains the distinct impression that to have "empathy" is rega rded as a fa r more
noble achievement for a therapist than mere "sym pa thy, " since the forme r has
come to imply a much deeper sort of "emotional kn owing, " to use Greenson's
(1960) apt phrase.
Interestingly enough, however, "empathy" is a r elative new come r to the
English language . According to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED ) [1971], it
emerged as late as 1912; but even more intriguing is the fact that its original
meaning was noticeably and importantly different from th e one to whi ch we are
now accustomed. Its first recorded English usage warrants quotation in full:
[Lipps] propounded the theory that the appreciation of a work of art
depended upon the capacity of the spectator to project hi s own
personality into the object of contemplation. One had to 'feel on esel f
into it' . . . This mental process he called by the name of Einfuhlung,
or, as it has been translated, Empathy (OED, 1971 , Supplement)
"Empathy," as here described, is clearly r evealed to be an essentia lly narcissistic
phenomenon: the subject has projected his own personality into th e object to be
2For an introduction to the now-formidable literature on empathy, see Creensori's
excellen t article (1960), as well as that o f Post (1980), wh ich provid es an interesting
revi ew.
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understood, which consequently acts as a sort of mirror , reflecting back aspects
originating from the subject. Webster (1986, p . 2317) add itio na lly notes that the
term is "frequently employed with reference to a nonhuman object " (my ital ics),
and that it possesses the least emotional content of an y of th e synonyms of
"sympathy," in keeping with its fundamentall y narcissistic legacy. T his should
come as a surprise, given its current employment to represent a sort of apex of
non-narcissistic understanding, wherein the therapist ostensibly tran scends th e
limitations of self-interest to immerse himself in th e patient 's emotional world.
As in the case of " r iva l," whose linguisti c history revea led to us the
unconscious identification of friend with foe, so with " empathy" : th e opposites
of narcissism and, for want ofa better term, non-narcissism are embraced by one
and the same word. Such paradoxes are a hallmark of primary process think ing
(see Freud, 1900, p. 318; 1910). Yet this curious historical transformation of th e
meaning of "empathy" also emphasizes a general and fundamenta l parad ox
posed by the human quest for knowledge: that man 's understanding of his
surroundings (which include his fellow men) is both predicated upon an d limited
by the narcissistic projection of personal cha racte r istics, mental and emotional.
Freud succinctly illustrated the dilemma when he di scu ssed th e bi rth of the idea
of consciousness. He observed that
Without any special reflection we attribute to everyone else our own
constitution and therefore our own consciousn ess as well , and th at
this identification is a sine qua non of our understanding. T his
inference (or this identification) was formerly extended by the ego to
other human beings, to animals, plants, inanimate objects and to the
world at large, and proved serviceable so long as th eir similari ty to the
individual ego was overwhelmingly great; but it becomes more
untrustworthy in proportion as the difference between the eg o and
these "others" widened (1915, p. 169).
For example, by endowing animals with human fea tures and mo tives,
primitive man's understanding and ultimately his sur vival among th em was
aided. Yet, as we well know today, a scientific study of animal behavior
necessarily eschews such anthropomorphism, recognizing there in a most de fi-
nite barrier to further knowledge. 1 believe that this very issue , namely, th e ro le
of narcissism in man's search for the truths of Nature, is o ne of th e most crucial
for the history of science.
In the therapeutic setting the therapist must guard against tendencies to
project his own ideas or emotional states onto th e patient, lest he falsify the
latter's experiences and communications. Simply speaking, the more the patient
functions as the therapist's mirror, the less actual truth about th e patient will be
perceived by the therapist. Thus the most understanding th erapist is one whose
projective distortions are kept to an absolute minimum.
As psychotherapists who are accustomed to attaching weight to the
alterations and nuances of our patients ' language over th e course of treatm ent ,
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we must not shy away from inquiring into th e significance of o ur ha ving adopted
a word whose original meaning so clearly differed in esse n tia ls from the one
e ventu a lly assigned to it, th e more so since a perfectl y acceptab le term was
already at hand-one moreover whose heritage was a rela ti vely long and noble
one. I re fer to "sym pathy ," wh ich appeared in English as early as 1596 to
indicate confo r mity or com m unity of feeling between persons (OED, 1971). In
co ntras t to " em pathy, " it is not a translation from th e te r m inology of German
aesthetics, but a direct d erivative from the Greek. In its literal sense it means a
" fee ling with" ; " empathy" connotes " feel ing in" ("sym" is Gree k fo r "with,"
"em" for " in").
Are there psychological implicati ons of th e differe nce betwee n these two
prefi xes? All ow me to offer th e foll owin g specu latio ns .
" Wi th " implies awareness and ac knowledgment of another person , as well
as a certa in sepa rate ness: in shor t , co-ex iste nce. " In," howe ver , would seem to
imply something different-the destruction of th e object through a process of
merger or replacement. To be in so rne one's shoes, for example, means that the
shoes' owner has been effec tive ly replaced, o r in the langu age of the uncon-
scious, destroyed. The five-year-old girl wh o wears her mother 's high heels
fulfills th ereby th e oed ipa l fa ntasy of matricide as she ta kes mother's place in
rela t ion to father. L. Frank Baurri 's ma sterpiece , The Wizard ofOz; supports th is
interpretation: Dorothy inherits th e magical shoes of th e witc h after she has
unwittingly killed her. Thus, in a ce r tain sense , to em-pa thize mean s to usurp or
destroy.
T o be " in" someo ne's psychological wo rld also seems to connote a rather
grand iose idea l whi ch sa t isfies the th erapist 's desires for complete, omniscient
understanding- an obv ious fa llacy . Lik e it o r no t , there are limits to what an y
o ne person can kn ow about another, and we must be careful to ac knowledge this
fact , st r ikingly proved by the unpredict abil ity of behavior ma nifested so
fr equently by those whom we profess to know well-pat ients, fri ends, spouses.
It is a matter of practi cal consequence, the refore , whether as th e rapists we
st r ive to " be" our patients, as some advocates of e mpathy appear to suggest. T o
sympathize wit h them in a way that allows for the resonance of unconscio us
p rocesses (Freud, 1912 , pp. 115- I 16) is indeed diffi cu lt enough .
An examp le of th e emot iona l kn owin g towards which we can aim, a nd
whi ch I urge we call "sympa thetic understanding" rather tha n "empathy," is
provided by Freud himself. Theodor Reik went to Freud for a na lysis whi le in the
midst of diffi culties during his middle fo rties, and he wrote of " the penetrating
sagacity , the human understandin g, the wisdom, an d th e kindness of the great
man" (1954 , p . 261 ). More speci fica lly, Re ik depicted an e legant illustration of
Freud's p rofound appreciation of h is pa t ient's hidden emotional processes:
In the last session I clinked the coi ns in m y pocket whil e giving myself
up to fr ee associations. I casua lly remarke d th a t playin g wit h money
showed m y a na l-e rotic tendencies. Freud answered serious ly: "That
is, of co urse, nonsense . You thin k of your bro th ers and you are glad
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that yo u are now ab le to send them money." (Re ik, 1954 , pp.
261-262).
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Reik traced his chain of associat ions a nd ad m itted that he had had a fleetin g
thought of his brothers, but one which he had not bothered to express, and he
marveled at Freud's "fine unconscious understanding. " O f course, such a feat is
possible only if o ne is ex q uisite ly attuned to the patient's emot iona l state. In this
instance , suc h sym pa thet ic resonance permitted Freud to di sm iss a trite theoreti-
ca l co mment, a nd to penetrate to the core of Reik 's thoughts and fee lings to
facilitate insight.
In this brie f paper, fran kly fragmenta ry a nd speculative, I hope to have
directed the reader's attention to th e hidden mea nings and uses of words an d
their potential relevan ce to our psych otherapeutic attitude, using the curious
linguistic features of " empathy" as an exam ple . If nothing else, I trust that my
plea for "sym pathy" will have piqued interest in th e role played by terminology
in shaping our thought.
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